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ABSTRACT
Current critical governance trends raise important questions for scholars in
the field of integrity policies. Currently, scholars agree that governance
trends show declining trends in the fields of democracy, human rights, just-
ice, rule of law, corruption, conflicts of interest, politicization, protection of
privacy, equality, and freedom of the press. These trends exist in many
countries, albeit to a different degree. On the other hand, one can also
observe an expansion of integrity policies. In the field of conflicts of interest
(CoI), for more than a decade, CoI-policies have become ever more compre-
hensive and sophisticated. Countries implement ever more policies, intro-
duce stricter standards and invest more in the implementation of CoI
policies. CoI policies become more complex and the institutionalization and
management of CoI policies more professional. In view of these seemingly
paradoxical trends, the purpose of this article is to discuss the relationship
between these critical Governance trends and integrity policies. We discuss
the case of conflict of interest policies for Ministers/Secretaries. We conclude
that trends toward critical governance fit with the expansion of integrity
policies for various reasons, but mostly because they are (increasingly) used




policies, conflicts of interest,
effectiveness of policies
Introduction
Public policies can only be effective if they are supported by governance processes that support
these policies from the design of the policy to its enforcement. In the field of ethics, for a long
time, the focus has been on the adoption of new rules, but not on the implementation and
enforcement (Demmke & Moilanen, 2012, p. 55).
During the last decades, the political climate seemed to become more favorable for integrity
policies. Politicians have also discovered that moral action helps them to gain political support,
for example, by using anti-corruption agendas as a political weapon against political opponents.
As regards the implementation of Conflict of Interest (CoI) policies, countries have also started
to invest in ever-new sophisticated ethics management systems (Hoekstra, 2015; Hoekstra et al.,
2021; Hoekstra & Kaptein, 2012). Anechiarico & Jacobs defined this as the birth of a “panoptic
vision” of integrity policies (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, p. 23), integritism, or moralism of public
policies (Driver, 2005) (defined as the illicit use of moral consideration).
CONTACT Christoph Demmke demmke@outlook.de Public Management, University of Vaasa, Wolffintie 34, 65101
Vaasa, Finland.
 2021 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
PUBLIC INTEGRITY
https://doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2021.1987056
Amongst scholars, there is wide agreement that the existence of effective integrity systems is
only possible in a supportive governance context. Almost all questions that occupy scholars of
public integrity are premised on the need for maintaining the functioning of democratic (govern-
ance) systems and values like merit, impartiality, professionalism, fairness, anti-discrimination,
etc. Today, there is a wide consensus amongst scholars that governance changes should be com-
patible with the principles of rule of law, diversity, equity, accountability, and organizational just-
ice. Also, all innovations in the field of governance assume the need for an impartial, just, and
fair governance system that may simply not be possible in an authoritarian and non-democratic
system. Finally, most experts in the field of governance accept that Human Resource
Management systems should be free of too much individual (political) discretion and conflicts
of interest.
Unfortunately, during the last decades, almost all recent governance indices show worrying
trends in the fields of democracy, human rights, justice, rule of law, corruption, politicization,
transparency, inequality, and freedom of the press. For example, the transformation index of the
Bertelsmann Foundation notes that democratic backsliding continues in Europe (Bertelsmann
Foundation, 2020). On a more global level, statistics from Freedom House (2021) and the
Economist Intelligence Unit (2020) show that the state of human rights, democracy, individual
and media freedom is deteriorating, the number of authoritarian political systems is increasing,
and even those that respect the rule of law and democratic principles appear less democratic and
less inclined to cherish values and principles (Bauer & Becker, 2021; European Commission,
2021). According to the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (2020), more countries declined
than improved in overall rule of law performance for the third year in a row. Another index, the
so-called Edelman Trust Barometer (2021) reported a general decline of trust in government and
leadership. Finally, Transparency International noted in its corruption perception index 2021
almost no improvements as regards the development of (perceived) corruption levels.
Also, in the field of scholarly research in integrity policies, experts note a worldwide increase
in corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi & Johnston, 2017), the politicization of
public administrations (Cooper, 2021) and new value challenges arising from digitalization rends,
especially as regards the protection of privacy (Royakkers et al., 2018). In the field of Human
Resource Management, experts note the emergence of new forms of organizational injustice
(Demmke, 2020) and threats to merit-based systems (Sandel, 2020) in the global context of grow-
ing economic and social inequality (Kotkin, 2020; Piketty, 2017; 2020; Savage, 2021) and decreas-
ing levels of social mobility (Friedman & Laurison, 2021). These trends also exist in many
European countries that have become less stable and resilient in light of the continuous under-
mining of democratic standards (Sch€afer & Z€urn, 2021). Almost opposite to the above-mentioned
trends toward moralism and political correctness, experts (Lukes, 2008) discuss the emergence of
moral relativism and the decline of universally accepted values.
In light of these seemingly paradoxical trends (Nieuwenburg, 2007) the purpose of this article
is to discuss the relationship between these critical governance trends and integrity policies. We
define critical governance trends as varying trends toward bad governance, or the opposite of
good governance (Rothstein, 2012) without necessarily having completed the transition toward a
bad governance system yet. How do these trends affect change in the field of integrity policies?
And, vice versa: How do integrity policies influence critical governance outcomes?
Looking into this broad relationship is a daunting task. Overall, linking critical governance
outcomes with integrity reforms is not a very popular issue. This is strange, as the very purpose
of integrity policies is to serve good governance objectives. Contrary to this, it should be expected
that critical governance trends are related to a decline of the importance of integrity policies as
such. Overall, given the current state of democratic backsliding in many countries, one might
expect more interest in the link between governance trends—and the development of integ-
rity policies.
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In the past, numerous studies have linked a range of economic, social, and institutional variables with
good governance and also with critical governance outcomes, mostly, with corruption in government.
Yet, robust evidence on how integrity policies relate to critical governance is largely unavailable (Meyer-
Sahling et al., 2018, p. 276). According to Johnson and Fritzen (2021), the good governance agenda lacks
a persuasive theory of change and context. Results have been—with a few exceptions—unimpressive.
However, the question of what exactly is the relationship between critical governance outcomes
and integrity policies is a fundamental one. Yet it is not at all simple. One difficulty is to accept
that many variables influence the outcomes of governance reforms and integrity policies.
Moreover, governance and integrity reforms always have various (conflicting) reform effects at the
same time. Thus, there is neither a clear causal relationship between governance reform and out-
come, neither trends from good to worse, from bad to good, nor between populism and integrity
policies (Bauer & Becker, 2021). Therefore, it is difficult to measure the impact of governance
reforms on issues like the decline of rule of law, corruption, conflicts of interest, politicization, and
organizational injustice. Vice versa, it is also difficult to measure integrity policies and the develop-
ment of corruption, conflicts of interests, and integrity violations. Overall “the literature provides
limited information on the actual number and characteristics of scandals involving integrity viola-
tions by politicians” (Huberts et al., 2021, p. 5). The development of integrity indices about the
development of integrity violations is only at the beginning (Huberts et al., 2021, p. 5).
To shed more light on the relationship between critical governance and the development of
integrity policies, we will take as an example the case of the development of Conflict of Interest
policies (CoI) for Ministers (in US terminology: Secretaries). The article presents empirical find-
ings from a comparative study for the European Parliament which was carried out in the year
2020 (European Parliament, 2020). The results were validated and discussed in the European
Parliament in December 2020 and during the Portuguese EU-Presidency in June 2021. By con-
ducting this type of empirical research on the CoI systems of 18 EU-Member States, in-depth
insight into an extremely complex and politically very sensitive subject could be gained. Because
of its longitudinal approach, for the first time, we are also in the position to measure the develop-
ment of CoI policies and the shift of governance trends in the field of ethics policies over time.
The findings of this empirical research incited us to continue with further explorative research
which was guided by the following research questions:
Do current critical governance trends lead to a weakening of standards in the field of CoI? Do we
observe more shortcomings in the implementation and enforcement of CoI requirements? Or, con-
trary, does the generalized and inflated use of the term moral scandal, the increased (digital) media
visibility of scandals, and the political abuse of moral issues lead to more and stricter rules and poli-
cies, as long as these policies are not enforced, and do not “hurt” politicians? Could it be that politi-
cians in all countries call for stricter standards and moral campaigns against the seemingly unethical
political opponents (and competing elites) and help populist strategies far more than politicians genu-
inely committed to fighting anti-corruption and conflicts of interest (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2020, p. 100)?
In the past, numerous studies have linked a range of economic, social, and institutional varia-
bles with good governance (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015, 2020; Rothstein, 2012). Yet, most of this litera-
ture overlooked the change of CoI policies in the more recent context of critical governance
trends. In the following sections, we first assess the literature about the effectiveness of policy
instruments in the field of CoI. Overall, until now, there exists no empirical research on the
effectiveness of CoI policies for ministers. This is remarkable, as ministers exercise important
positions of power and influence Second, we explain our methodological approach.
Evaluating the effectiveness of CoI policies in a changing governance context
Comparative research about CoI amongst holders of public service started only recently (Auby
et al., 2014; Demmke et al., 2008; Peters & Handschin, 2012; Saint-Martin & Thompson, 2006).
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Empirical research in the field is an exception. So far, research about the CoI of ministers repre-
sents a “black hole.”
As we will illustrate later on, the EU-Member States struggle to manage, monitor and enforce
CoI despite their own increased political, regulatory, and institutional efforts throughout the past
decades. CoI policies also require sophisticated and complex examinations into individual
motives, individual behavior, and individual decision-making (Stark, 2000).
International evaluations use a variety of sources to assess and compare public integrity, such
as expert assessments, surveys of citizens, risk assessments, and data on legal proceedings, sanc-
tions, and fines (Lamboo et al., 2015). However, differently from the field of corruption, no coun-
try is actively monitoring the development of CoI, nor whether the policies introduced, achieved
the objectives. In fact, it is difficult to know whether certain CoI rules and policies are effective,
or not and what are the costs and benefits of conflicts of interest laws (Rosenson, 2006).
Methodology and approach
Our research interest was to analyze the effectiveness of existing rules and policies in place refer-
ring to different types of CoI. To be able to carry out a longitudinal analysis about trends from
2008 to 2020, we followed a similar method that was used in an earlier comparative study on a
similar topic, i.e., conducting written expert interviews (in line with the approach of elite studies)
with public officials from different government institutions to ensure the reliability of our data
(Demmke et al., 2008).1 We also decided to carry out the survey in co-operation with the
European Public Administration Network under the umbrella of the EU-Presidency (which is
composed of top officials from all countries of the EU and officials from the European
Commission). As regards the operationalization of the term CoI, we suggested to the countries a
detailed list of 15 different CoI, as the following table shows, reflecting a widened definition of
CoI, including pecuniary and non-pecuniary issues, CoI by family members of the Holder of
Public Office as well as CoI relating to the public and private lives of office holders (Table 1).
During the period from January to March 2020, a questionnaire was drafted, containing several
open-ended and closed questions. The questionnaire was provided to the EU-network to ensure
that experts from all EU countries would be consulted as early as possible and to get a chance to
pre-test the questionnaire. After internal validation of the survey, ultimately, 17 countries (exclud-
ing Germany which responded to the survey by mail) responded to this survey. After completion,
we analyzed and filtered all answers and identified those which were either still missing or unclear.
In those cases, the respective countries were re-contacted on a bilateral basis in a “third round.”
Applied to our research approach, this meant creating awareness for potential biases in respond-
ing to our survey. In fact, all respondents were top officials from central public administrations,
government agencies, and anti-corruption bodies. To avoid (distorted) personal statements by top-
level respondents to the survey, we cross-checked that the delivered survey answers and data were
discussed internally and coordinated with several other persons, anti-corruption agencies, and min-
istries. Still, we note that top officials are members of organizations with specific reliability,
Table 1. List of potential CoI.
1. Declaration of financial interests and assets
2. HPO’s spouse’s activities
3. Provisions relating to the declaration of interests
4. Outside activities: Political activities
5. Outside activities: Honorary positions
6. Outside activities: Conferences




1. Rules on receptions and representations
2. Accepting gifts, decorations, and distinctions
3. General rules on impartiality and conflicts of interest
4. Specific rules on the incompatibility of posts and
professional activities before or during the term
of office
5. Restrictions on professional commitments or holding
other posts after leaving office
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institutional knowledge, and experience. Experience shows that official responses to empirical sur-
veys differ according to the choice of the target groups. For example, leaders respond differently
than technical staff and official sources differ from academic sources. Government responses are
often more positive than individual responses by public employees. Moreover, the respondents in
our survey exclusively represent official government sources. Thus, we acknowledge the danger of
sources of bias when asking higher-ranking officials to provide official data.
To operationalize and to measure the existing policies and instruments in the EU countries,
we introduced the term “policy coverage density” which defines the quantitative degree of cover-
age of conflict of issues by laws, rules, and codes. If a country regulates/manages all Conflict of
Interest issues, the country has a high degree of coverage density.
The data gained from the survey was subsequently analyzed with data from different surveys,
such as Eurobarometer, Gallup trust polls, Transparency International corruption indices, or
Quality of Government data (University of Gothenburg) to inter alia examine the relationship
between the policy coverage density, trust, tolerance of corruption, etc. It is worth noting that the
issues we measured are very complex social phenomena and can therefore hardly be captured in
their entirety by one single index. For that reason, we have as far as possible included different
indices to analyze the same question from different angles. For instance, we have measured dem-
ocracy using the index by the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Bertelsmann Foundation, lead-
ing to nearly identical results. This gives us far more confidence in the reliability of our results.
Because of the explorative nature of this paper and the relatively small number of observations
(which also varied for some politically sensitive questions), we weren’t able to conduct a full-
fledged quantitative analysis relying on regression analyses. The results presented in the following
sections are mostly based on descriptive statistics and correlation analysis. Since correlation is not
causation, our results should not be mistaken for causal linkages. However, given the explorative
interest in how trends toward critical governance and ever more CoI regulation relate to each
other and are intertwined, correlation analysis presents clear indications about the nature of this
relationship. Additionally, descriptive statistics allow us to decipher patterns within and between
the Member States, which is imperative to understand the relation between integrity policies and
critical governance and provide a basis for further quantitative inquiry. Due to the small number
of observations, the significance levels are not reliable and a 5%-significance level would be too
strict to be applied to this case. Therefore, we are often focusing on patterns we observed in indi-
vidual countries and clusters of countries without necessarily only using statistically significant
evidence (e.g., the relation between high policy coverage density and high levels of corruption in
many backsliding European democracies). While this may raise concerns about the generalizabil-
ity of our findings, it doesn’t disqualify the evidence presented for the EU-Member States.
Research hypotheses
In our survey, we operationalized CoI defining a list of 15 different CoI. Because we wanted to pro-
vide a longitudinal analysis regarding EU-Member States’ ethics frameworks, we followed almost the
same method which was used in a similar survey (with almost identical questions) and approached
the same type of respondents as in an earlier comparative study in 2008 (Demmke et al., 2008).
This article is based upon exploratory research since it tries to identify new issues in the field
of public integrity that can provide new insights for future research.
We have operationalized the research according to three hypotheses:
 The first H1 is that overall, countries have a higher coverage density than in 2007. The first
hypothesis is based upon the notion according to which ethics policies are growing in com-
plexity, meaning there will be ever more regulation in place. For example, the concept of
Conflict of Interest has changed throughout the decades, moving from a legal perspective to
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new areas of life, such as post-employment and spouse’s activities. This, in turn, creates pres-
sure for more regulation.
 The second H2 argues that countries with higher levels of corruption have a higher policy dens-
ity coverage. According to the hypothesis, countries with higher levels of corruption regulate
more CoI policies. When linking this hypothesis to critical governance, ethics policies can be
used as tools fighting political enemies instead of seeking the actual integrity of government in
corrupt countries. Furthermore, ethics policies can also be used as a tool to seemingly address
critical governance trends, but in reality, reinforcing them through ineffective policies which
allow governments to uphold the image of democracy while actually undermining it. This
indicates how CoI policies are a moral minefield through moral stigmatization, political weap-
onry, and moral measurement of persons (Stark, 2000, p. 266).
 Last, the third hypothesis (H3) claims that Higher levels of coverage density do not condition
improvements on good governance indicators (effectiveness, freedom of the press, democracy, rule
of law, impartiality, etc.). Not all countries are seeking effectiveness through regulation,
let alone strengthening democracy or rule of law. Even though reforms in integrity policies
are more comprehensive than ever before, it can be questioned whether they really contribute
to the principles of good governance but, rather, to critical governance. More regulation does
not necessarily entail anti-corruption or less Conflicts of Interest. For some, it might even be
in their interest to prevent effective ethics regulation without creating the image of a defect-
ive democracy.
Discussion and shortcomings of the data
In this highly sensitive survey, the most important challenge when comparing and analyzing CoI
policies for ministers concerned the access to data and obtaining honest answers to sensitive and
complex questions. Not only the availability but also the reliability of data was a sore point in the
development of this comparative work. Overall, we concluded that no country is generating suffi-
cient, adequate, and accessible data in the field of CoI. Instead of providing data, some countries
responded to our survey by adding long lists of existing rules in the field.
In doing this type of research, one also needs to take into consideration the many existing spe-
cific features of the national systems, avoidance of different linguistic meanings and definitions,
etc. In addition, there are challenges in comparing and analyzing the different (legal, political,
organizational, and HR) instruments in different legal and administrative traditions and
many languages.
Survey results and research evidence
After decades of focusing on the adoption of rules, all EU-Member States have started to invest
in the institutionalization of ethics policies. This increasing investment by countries leads to a
fragmentation of institutional responsibilities, making it more difficult to clarify competencies.
Overall, oversight and control tasks are shared amongst various actors like specific ethics and
anti-corruption bodies, HR departments, the court of auditors, ombudspersons, and integrity offi-
cers. As regards enforcement practices, this also requires the constant adaptation of knowledge
and skills of those who oversee the conduct of individuals. However, individualized monitoring is
time-consuming and increasingly costly.
These trends must be seen before the background that countries have not only implemented
more rules, but they have also implemented more rules on a broad range of CoI issues.
Interestingly, more than 30% of national responses considered “political reluctance to sanction”
and the monitoring of “the high complexity of individual CoI” as the biggest challenges in fight-
ing CoI (Table 2).
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In the related field of corruption research, we note a positive relationship between
Government Integrity and the unacceptability of corruption, confirming the hypothesis that Good
Governance and “ethics pay off.” In the field of CoI, we find that countries in the European
Union are extremely busy establishing more professional integrity systems by introducing not
only more rules, but also by introducing stricter disclosure requirements and by broadening con-
cepts of CoI (e.g., by expanding the term revolving door and personal/spouse/family interest).
How does this relate to findings that there are trends of critical governance? The results of our
empirical survey allow for the following conclusion. The development of CoI policies fits with the
principles of critical governance because integrity policies are becoming more popular, politicized,
and instrumentalized—as long as these policies do not hurt politicians or are effective. Often, CoI
policies are symbolic policies since they are (often) not (strictly and independently) enforced
upon politicians. These shortcomings in the monitoring and enforcement process can be inten-
tional (politically motivated) or unintentional (because of lack of resources, lack of personnel,
time-consuming and complex investigations, etc.).
H1: Overall, countries have a higher coverage density than in 2008
The first hypothesis was confirmed. Overall, countries in the EU regulate CoI more intensively
than in 2008. Our longitudinal data shows that nearly every country has more rules and policies
in place today than before. Countries also have higher policy coverage on most CoI issues. As
such, this means that what was legal a generation ago is considered an ethical violation today.
“There are many more laws to be broken nowadays.” (Rosenson, 2006, p. 163) (Figure 1).
As the survey results show, amongst the 15 analyzed CoI policies, every CoI issue also has a
higher policy coverage density than a decade ago (Figure 2).
Our survey also confirms the findings of the 2008 study (Demmke et al., 2008) which shows
that the Central and Eastern European countries have higher regulated systems than, for example,
the Northern European countries. This is important to keep in mind before the background of
critical governance trends in many European countries. While one could suggest that other coun-
tries like Luxembourg or the Netherlands also have very high levels of policy coverage density,
(1) the different understanding of law and code needs to be kept in mind when analyzing the
data, and (2) the vast majority of countries with 100% policy coverage density show worrying
trends in terms democratic governance and the rule of law. Overall, Sweden stands out as the
least regulated system. For example, Northern European countries have no rules in place as
regards spouse activities (such as obligations to declare income, or assets), whereas this issue is
very densely regulated in Central European countries as well as Continental European countries.
This can be explained by the fact that Northern European countries are more careful when bal-
ancing privacy rights with obligations to disclosing private interests. This is especially interesting
in comparison with the other EU-Member States included in our survey. Countries like Sweden
usually rank very high on corruption indices (meaning low levels of corruption) or indices meas-
uring democracy and the rule of law. Additionally, Latvia is one of the only countries to have
actually deregulated CoI, while at the same time performing better on the Transparency
International Corruption Index than in 2008. This does not suggest that deregulating is the better
Table 2. Country responses as to the main challenges in managing CoI.
g1 (revolving doors) Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia
g2 (post-employment) Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden
g3 (lack of monitoring experts) Austria, Czech Republic, Portugal
g4 (lack of financial resources) Austria, Czech Republic, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia
g5 (political reluctance to sanction) Austria, Czech Republic, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden
g6 (grey zones) Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovakia
g7 (high tolerance for CoI of ministers) Austria, Portugal
g8 (high complexity of the issues) Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden
g9 (trends toward politization) Austria, Slovakia
EXPLAINING THE POPULARITY OF INTEGRITY POLICIES 7
way, but it again manifests that higher regulation levels do not necessarily condition bet-
ter governance.
Apart from the analysis of the list of all potential CoI issues we also examined the situation as
regards the group of most important CoI (see Table 1) to get more comparable evidence about the
core CoI issues. In all countries (except for Luxemburg and The Netherlands), the use of the law is the
predominant form of regulation. This shows that countries are still having a strong belief in compli-
ance-based approaches despite the popular rhetoric to which times of regulatory approaches belong to
the past (Figure 3).
Overall, countries that entered the EU in 2004 (and later) have a higher level of policy cover-
age density than older EU members. Northern European countries have fewer rules and policies
in place than the other EU countries. Classical bureaucratic countries (like Luxemburg) have a
higher policy coverage density than countries with more managerial-type administrative systems
(like the Netherlands). Northern European countries have less regulation in place than other
European countries. This can be explained by the fact that citizens in these countries have higher
trust in the integrity of government. However, hybrid systems (like the Czech Republic) that are
combinations of bureaucratic and managerial elements, had the most regulation.
To summarize, we empirically witness trends toward ever more regulation within the EU-
Member, as well as the expansion and “deepening” of CoI concepts. We also observe that
Figure 1. Average policy coverage density by the member state from 2007 to 2020.
Figure 2. Average policy coverage density by CoI issue from 2007 to 2020.
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countries with higher levels of regulation density mostly suffer more from critical governance
trends than countries with lower levels of regulation. While there is no evidence for causation
between lower policy coverage density and better governance, this result clearly shows that critical
governance trends can go hand in hand with a seemingly ever-stricter system of integrity policies,
indicating the lack of effectiveness either of the policies themselves of their enforcement.
H2: Countries with higher levels of corruption have more regulation (coverage density)
The second hypothesis was confirmed by the data. The EU-Member States with higher corrup-
tion levels have a higher coverage density than countries with lower levels of corruption. The lat-
ter can be interpreted differently: (a) more rules and policies are not effective in the fight against
corruption and CoI, (b) more rules and policies are a reaction to high levels of corruption and
policies and distrust in politicians (Figure 4).
In addition, the higher the policy coverage density is, the more people also believe that corrup-
tion is widespread. The higher the policy coverage is for ministers/secretaries, the more people
believe that too close ties with politics and business lead to corruption. On the other hand,
however, the higher the policy coverage density, the more people believe that anti-corruption
measured are applied impartially. And the higher the policy coverage density, the more people
believe that corruption is tackled effectively by governments. This can be partly explained by the
fact that citizen perception is often prone to contradictions and paradoxes. Nevertheless, we see
clear indications that the effects of higher policy coverage density are far from being only in favor
of Good Governance.
More intriguing, we note trends toward the politicization of ethics policies, the toleration of
CoI of ministers, and reluctance to monitor and sanction CoI of ministers. In this context, our
data illustrate that systems with lower democratic standards and less performance as regards the
rule of law, accept CoI more easily than systems with high standards. This toleration of CoI also
correlates with poor governance performance. Moreover, within the administrations, inspectors
and monitoring officials are also tolerant if ministers face CoI. One country mentioned a “too
high tolerance for CoI of ministers” and one country “trends toward politicization.” Obviously,
these answers reveal a lack of political will and/or too high levels of tolerance against flagrant
CoI. Although citizens are highly critical, distrustful, and disapprove of breaches of integrity of
elites, this may not prevent them from tolerating many different forms of unethical behavior
(Lascoumes, 2014). Sunstein (2021) explains toleration from a different angle: “If people are sur-
rounded by conduct that is morally abominable, or seeing a lot of it, they will not disapprove of,
and may even be fine with, conduct that is morally bad (… ). That is the power of normal”
(Sunstein, 2021, p. 21). Thus, politicians who seek to undermine democratic goals might suggest
Figure 3. Coverage of most important CoI issues—use of the law.
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that certain restrictions on the right to vote, freedom of the press, or integrity violations are per-
fectly normal (Sunstein, 2021, p. xii).
While corruption is not the same as CoI, underperformance on corruption prevention can cer-
tainly be used as a proxy to draw conclusions about the general approach toward ethical miscon-
duct. Our data show that countries with higher levels of policy coverage density are generally
attributed worse scores on the Transparency International Corruption Index, as can be seen in
Figure 4. Additionally, these countries do also score low on the Freedom House Index measuring
the effectiveness of corruption prevention.
Preventing and reducing CoI is also difficult because of the relationship between Good
Governance and the acceptability of corruption. In countries with a higher democracy index,
there is also less acceptance of corruption. Also, countries with better safeguards against corrup-
tion have generally higher scores on the democracy index. Thus, if countries want to take the
fight against unethical behavior seriously, an important precondition for this is to—simultan-
eously—maintain or strengthen systems of Good Governance. We also note the same logic as
regards the situation of the rule of law. The higher the rule of law index of a country, the less
corruption is being accepted (Figure 5). This reveals a fundamental problem. Critical governance
trends go hand in hand with higher acceptance of corruption and misconduct. As such, critical
governance has direct implications for ethics policies.
H3: The level of regulation is not related to Good Governance (effectiveness, freedom of the press,
democracy, rule of law, impartiality, etc.)
According to the data, the toleration and shortcomings in the implementation and enforce-
ment of CoI are higher in countries with lower ratings in democracy, rule of law, impartiality,
and government integrity.
The EU-Member States struggle to manage CoI despite their own increased political, regula-
tory, and institutional efforts throughout the past decades. Efforts in monitoring, enforcing, and
evaluating (the effectiveness of) ethics policies remain a tremendously difficult task. CoI policies
require sophisticated and complex examinations into individual motives, individual behavior, and
Figure 4. Relationship between policy coverage density and the performance on the corruption index.
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individual decision-making (Stark, 2000). Thus, even if countries intend to implement and
enforce CoI policies effectively, this represents a major endeavor. At present, countries do not
even know whether conflicts of interest are increasing or decreasing. This confirms a study by
Huberts et al. (2021, p. 5) who suggest the development of a political integrity index to measure
integrity violations of politicians (because of the limited empirical research on the number and
characteristics of violations).
Conclusions
CoI policies address individual misconduct, and not organizational, economical, or institutional
causes of misconduct. Thus, differently from anti-corruption policies, CoI policies follow a so-
called individualized “bad apples” approach. This contrasts not only with other ethics policies but
also with traditional integrity logic that was based on concepts of institutional integrity
(Demmke, 2020) and the abstraction of personal integrity. With the introduction of integrity
management, the issue of rule violations is personalized to a previously unknown degree (K€uhl,
2020, p. 158). Consequently, also implementation strategies follow an individualized approach as
regards the monitoring of individual conduct. Managing and monitoring ever more potential
sources of bias imposes heavy burdens on professionals and institutions (Rodwin, 2018).
In times of critical governance trends, EU-Member States find themselves in a process in
which they constantly add more rules, stricter standards, broader definitions and invest in an
emerging ethics bureaucracy. EU countries also introduce ever more ethics bodies, ethics inspec-
torates, ethics committees, integrity officers, and audit bodies. However, responsibilities are often
fragmented, and coordination capacities are lacking. If in the past there seemed to be regulatory
gaps and a lack of enforcement, the more recent concern is that some governments have gone
overboard in building an elaborate, but fragmented legal and organizational ethics apparatus.
Figure 5. Relationship between acceptability of corruption and state of rule of law. Explanation: 1: Austria, 2: Belgium, 3:
Bulgaria, 4: Czech Republic, 5: France, 6: Hungary, 9: Netherlands, 10: Portugal, 11: Romania, 13: Slovenia, 14: Spain, 15: Sweden.
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However, this comprehensive and sophisticated ethics framework does not prevent/counterbal-
ance trends toward critical governance. We find that countries with high policy coverage density
also suffer from critical governance trends. Another major reason for the ineffectiveness of CoI
policies is when political scandals and new conflicts of interests appear, failure is attributed to
individuals (and not to structures and processes) and not strict-enough law. On the other hand,
tolerance for CoI increases, even if countries put the importance of CoI policies high on the
agenda, mostly for populist reasons. Often, CoI of Ministers are not enforced and tolerated, cred-
ible and independent monitoring bodies and enforcement mechanisms are lacking.
Thus, we partly agree that current trends toward critical governance fit with trends toward
more, tougher, and broader integrity policies. This can be explained, because integrity policies are
(increasingly) used as political instruments, abused as political weapons against political oppo-
nents, and used as a reaction to media scandals. In these cases, integrity policies can serve many
political interests. Still, in many cases, these policies are rather symbolic policies, as they do not
“hurt” politicians themselves.
To this should be added the notorious difficulty of implementing CoI policies effectively, what-
ever is the political context. CoI policies show limited effects in, both, compliance-based and
value-based cultures. As regards both approaches, there is growing insecurity about the best regu-
latory mix, the role of self-regulation, the effectiveness of deterrence mechanisms and sanctions,
the quality of regulation, and the need for other political, behavioral, and economical instruments.
Next, in all countries, the type of interest that the discourse regarding CoI addressed remained
largely pecuniary—hence “objective.” The types of private interests that were addressed were
hard, objective, and measurable. Today, definitions of CoI become ever broader. They can be
pecuniary, ideological, related to the interests of the spouse-, relatives- and relationships, emo-
tional, linked to different moral constraints, loyalties, concerns, prejudgments, biases, and affilia-
tions (Stark, 2000). This trend contributes to increasing confusion regarding the concept of CoI
and the inflation of the concept, making it “a less practical tool” (Rodwin, 2018).
We, therefore, conclude that trends toward critical governance may well be compatible with
the increasing importance of integrity policies and—in our case—conflict of interest policies
although the effective implementation of CoI policies does not only depend on critical governance
trends but as much on other factors that can be linked to the increasing complexity of the con-
cept of CoI in times of governance change.
Note
1. However, in this study, the authors analyzed the so-called regulation density index and examined more
categories of staff from a wider group of public institutions.
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